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Spheres of Influence as Negotiated Hegemony – The Case of Central Asia 
 
In the XIX century, as well as during the Cold War, spheres of influence were created and legitimized to pursue 
and sustain order in world politics, as well as to avoid direct confrontation between the great powers. 
Nowadays, they are considered as belonging to a past characterized by confrontation, power politics, balance 
of power and coercion. Yet, spheres of influence still constitute part of the present-day political vocabulary, 
and several regional dynamics are in fact framed and analysed by using this concept. Are spheres of influence 
returning, or have they simply evolved? How do spheres of influence look like in contemporary international 
relations? With a specific focus on Russia and Central Asia, this paper adopts an English School approach to the 
study of spheres of influence and offers a conceptualization of contemporary spheres of influence as 
structures of negotiated hegemony between the ‘influencer’ and the ‘influenced’ where norms and rules of 
coexistence are debated, contested and compromised on. The implications of this are multiple. Firstly, the 
approach allows for seeing spheres of influence as social structures where norms and rules of coexistence are 
in play. Secondly, it allows for an analysis of the implementation and the legitimacy of spheres of influence 
through history. Thirdly, by stressing the evolutionary character of spheres of influence, it puts the notion of 
their ‘return’ into question.  
 
 
Introduction 
Are spheres of influence returning? Although leaders in world politics reject the very idea of spheres 
of influence, for ‘the idea of going back to some 19th century idea of [them] makes no sense in the 
21st century, […] that’s very outdated’1 and ‘the world can no longer be divided into blocs, or 
spheres of influence’,2 as recently stated by Andrew Hurrell ‘there are certainly all too evident 
grounds for the view that we are witnessing a return to geopolitics’.3 Alexander Orakhelashvili seems 
to agree as well, as according to him, even if not outspokenly, ‘spheres of influence are widely 
practiced in international politics’ even nowadays.4  
This trend has also been enhanced by the progressive regionalization of world politics after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, which has created opportunities for new regional powers to 
develop their power-projection capabilities.5 The recent events in Ukraine have shown how the 
Russian government believes that territories contiguous to its borders remain within its competence, 
while Chinese actions in the South China Sea have all the elements of power-political games played 
within what is deemed to be Beijing’s sphere of influence.6 World politics seems to be marked again 
by the presence of weak, contested but nonetheless de facto existing spheres of influence in 
different regions.7 Therefore, there is the need for addressing the return of spheres of influence 
both in ‘international relations’ as well as in ‘International Relations’.8  
This paper aims to show that spheres of influence do not wax and wane, come and go, leave 
and return in a cyclical dynamic of recurrence and repetition,9 but rather evolve and transform 
according to the social, historical and legal context in which they are implemented. In particular, the 
central thesis of this paper is that spheres of influence in contemporary international society can be 
conceptualised as structural relations of negotiated hegemony, i.e. as a territorially-circumscribed 
hegemony that has to come to terms with the weaker, ‘influenced’ states, which play an active role 
in determining its degree of legitimacy and influence through its sovereign prerogatives. In this 
paper, ‘legitimacy’ is defined as the condition of being rightful, accepted via an agreement and 
voluntary consent rather than via imposition and fear, publicly recognized as valid and binding by 
the members of a given social system,10 while ‘influence’ is defined as the ability ‘to induce other 
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states and communities in the system to conform more closely to the purposes and practices of the 
hegemonic power.’11 
To advance such conceptualization, this paper adopts the theoretical lenses of the English 
School of International Relations (henceforth ES). This theoretical approach is based on the premise 
that states live in an anarchical society, i.e. a condition where despite the absence of a government 
or central recognized authority they are able to coexist with a minimum degree of order by 
respecting commonly agreed on rules, norms and institutions such as sovereignty, borders, basic 
principles of international law, nationalism and the balance of power.12 This paper shows that an ES 
treatment of spheres of influence will fill two blind spots. First, it will add a further theoretical 
perspective to a concept that has been treated mainly through the prism of realism.13 Second, by 
introducing the notion of negotiated hegemony, the paper will argue that spheres of influence are 
not a rejection of to-day world order, but can indeed be features of contemporary international 
society. 
The case study selected for this paper is that of Russia and Central Asia, understood as the 
region comprising the republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
This is because of three main reasons. First, Russia has always openly considered Central Asia as 
crucial for its own territorial security. Already in 1993, during the Tajik civil war, Russian President 
Boris Eltsin referred to Tajikistan’s southern border as Russia’s border.14 This geopolitical reading of 
Central Asia as related to Russia’s security,15 already noted by authors such as Nick Megoran and 
Sevara Sharapova,16 has been recently reasserted by Magda Leichtova, when arguing that ‘the 
Russian concept of its own identity is more closely connected with geographical location and the 
physical aspects of the existence of the Russian state.’17 Second, because Russia and Russian 
interests have been present in the region for centuries. As Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev 
has argued, ‘we are entwined with Russia by a common history and destiny. We cannot have a 
future without Russia.’18 Moreover, ‘no one has forgotten geography, and everyone knows, that 
Central Asia has had contact and close connections with Russia for many centuries. We feel the 
interest of Russia in Central Asia and unanimously agree with it.’19 Third, because despite its 
historical role in, geographical proximity to and civilizational commonality with Central Asia, it is still 
not clear, in academic debates, whether Russia has a sphere of influence in the region or not.20 
The paper is structured as follows: the first section discusses the notion of spheres of 
influence in the IR literature and the main tenets of ES theory. The second section introduces the 
conceptualization of spheres of influence as structures of ‘negotiated hegemony’, while the third 
one situates the argument in present-day times, and aims to answer the question as to whether a 
legitimate Russian sphere of influence is being established, or has already been established, in 
Central Asia. In the concluding section I will discuss the implications that the analysis carried out in 
the previous sections has for the concept of spheres of influence and the theorization thereof, and I 
will suggest potential synergies between the ES and geopolitics, in particular its critical strand. 
 
Spheres of influence and English School 
Spheres of influence are an essentially contested concept. Are they simply territorial arrangements? 
Are they mere projections of influence and control onto a given, exclusive territory? Are they tools, 
policies or geographical spaces? The essentially contested nature of the concept lies in the fact that 
there is almost no scholarship on the meaning of it, not to mention on the practices of influence in 
the relationships between major powers and smaller states in a given territorial domain. As Amitai 
Etzioni has aptly argued, ‘a review of the international relations literature on spheres of influence 
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reveals the dearth of existing research.’21 What we know is that the concept carries with itself the 
idea of violating a state’s (or states’) freedom of association and its territorial integrity when there is 
no conformation with the hegemon’s will. All is linear, univocal and uncontested.  
 
According to Edy Kaufman, for example, a ‘sphere of influence’ can be best described ‘as a 
geographic region characterised by the high penetration of one superpower to the exclusion of 
other powers and particularly of the rival superpower.22 Paul Keal seems to agree, defining a sphere 
of influence as ‘a determinate region within which a single external power exerts a predominant 
influence, which limits the independence or freedom of action of political entities within it.’23  
 
By looking at Soviet international relations during the Second World War, Geoffrey Roberts 
describes a sphere of influence as ‘a zone of […] strategic and political predominance unchallenged 
by any other great power’,24 thus highlighting the geographical and hierarchical relations between 
great and smaller powers mentioned above. Jan Nijman speaks of ‘geographical determinism’ when 
analysing superpower rivalries in the 30 years after the Cold War, referring to spheres of influence as 
unequal power relations embedded in specific geographical spaces,25 elements also emphasised by 
Bogdan and Preda in their work at the end of the Cold War.26  
 
Recently, Amitai Etzioni has argued that they are ‘best defined as international formations 
that contain one nation (the influencer) that commands superior power over others.’27 Following 
Etzioni, it can be argued that such an understanding of spheres of influence owes much to a realist 
understanding of international relations, which was predominant during Cold War years. This 
immediate understanding of spheres of influence based on geography and unequal power became a 
theoretical underpinning of the coexistence between superpowers and their balance of power. 
Therefore, he argues,  
 
from a realist viewpoint, a given superpower has no reason to oppose other powers 
extending their influence by forming [a sphere of influence] over other nations, as long 
as these attempts do not infringe on the superpower’s core interests. This is because 
spheres of influence tend to contribute to war avoidance, especially when the […] 
boundaries are clearly defined.28 
 
If this is the ossified, predominant theorization of spheres of influence, then two facts are evident. 
Firstly, the material reading of ‘power’ and ‘influence’ seems to be too narrow to capture other 
forms of potential control within a ‘sphere’, such as shaping the norms governing the regional space, 
or enjoying cultural preponderance within it. Secondly, such a rigid theorization of spheres of 
influence focuses too much on the idea of ‘exclusion’ (of other powers) and of ‘subjugation’ (of 
minor states) without taking into account the agency of smaller states at all. Therefore, to have a 
more nuanced, complex and deeper understanding of how spheres of influence look like today, I 
propose to consider them as social structures where both the influencer and the influenced are 
engaged in practices that ultimately shape the character of the sphere itself. In order to do so, I 
adopt the theoretical lenses of the ES.  
 
As anticipated above, the ES emphasizes the fact that states, rather than competing and 
fighting with each other to maximize their power, seek to maintain a certain degree of coexistence 
between themselves relying on commonly agreed norms such as the respect for each other’s 
sovereignty, the rules of international law and the diplomatic protocol. To ES theorists, the realm of 
international politics is better conceived of as a society, based on common interests and values, 
common rules and institutions shared by states on the basis of sovereign equality.29. It is important 
to specify that a society of states can exist and work both at the global and the regional level. As the 
next section will make clear, this has profound implications on how a sphere of influence can be 
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conceptualized as a negotiated hegemony, given that a sphere of influence is by definition 
geographically comparted.  
It should be noted immediately that the notion of ‘society’ is not exhaustive of the ES 
theoretical baggage. In fact, the ES sees world politics as the product of three different ontologies 
simultaneously at play: an international system, where security and military logics prevail; an 
international society, where norms, rules and institutions are in play; and a world society, where 
contacts between human beings, civilizations and cultures are pivotal.30 With respect to spheres of 
influence, this tripartition is important to stress, for ‘influence’ can indeed pertain to all three 
domains. As a matter of fact, one country can extend its influence over others by military means, 
thus affecting the security landscape in that region via the almost exclusive provision of weapons, 
alliances and military training; it can exercise influence through socialization, thus inducing other 
states to conform to preferred norms, values and institutions; it can promote influence at the level 
of habits, language and culture, often relying on previous historical linkages. Therefore, an ES 
approach seems better equipped to capture them in a single analytical framework. More on this, 
however, will be said below. 
The only contemporary systematic theorization of spheres of influence within the ES so far 
has been provided by Susanna Hast, whose book can be seen as an attempt to gather much-needed 
theory around the concept.31 Her book is, nonetheless, a study of spheres of influence as linguistic, 
metaphorical constructions rather than de facto orders or structural arrangements. Before her, both 
Hedley Bull and Paul Keal theorized spheres of influences as contributing to world order thanks to 
‘tacit understandings’ between great powers, while recently Robert Murray has written against this 
argument stating that spheres of influence are the product of Realpolitik rather than mutual 
understanding.32 However, these authors have focussed on the creation and definition of spheres of 
influence between great powers, focusing less on the relationship between ‘influencers’ and 
‘influenced’. In his work, Keal even clearly stresses that ‘the relationship between influencing powers 
and the states they influence is not [his] central concern’.33  
With specific respect to Russia and Central Asia, we are often confronted with the absence 
of theorization. In most works the notion of sphere of influence is taken for granted, and left 
undertheorized.34 As Hast puts it, ‘[Russia’s sphere of influence] represents something self-evident, 
undisputed and unproblematic’.35 Pourchot and Stivachtis have looked into Eurasia as an 
international society and Russia’s hegemonic practices in it, but they have not discussed whether 
order in the region amounts to a sphere of influence.36 Kaczmarska analyses Russia’s droit de regard 
in Eurasia, focussing on its attempts to establish a sphere of influence. Yet, how this sphere of 
influence is implemented is overlooked.37 Furthermore, Shunji Cui’s and Barry Buzan’s latest 
publication hints at the existence of spheres of influence conceptualized as regional orders 
structured around a single great power.38 Yet, this theoretical argument is not explored any further. 
What is therefore evident is that, as noted above, several scholars and pundits do still 
understand conflicts, unequal relations as well as unilateralism and Realpolitik in Eurasia in terms of 
spheres of influence. However, we still do not know how spheres of influence look like, in analytical 
terms, after the Cold War.39 In particular, the relationship between the ‘influencer’ and the 
‘influenced’ is still to be theorized.40 Therefore, rather than making claims about Russia’s sphere of 
influence, I concur that ‘it would be more interesting to ask what kind of sphere of influence the 
country pursues’.41 The next section introduces the concept of ‘negotiated hegemony’, and provides 
an analytical model to understand how spheres of influence can be theorized in contemporary 
international relations. 
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The notion of ‘negotiated hegemony’ and the structure of contemporary international society 
Despite neglecting the role of spheres of influence in international society, ES authors have 
nonetheless been interested in elements of hierarchy and hegemony, which are implicit in the 
notion of spheres of influence.42  
Within the ES tradition, hegemony is indirectly, albeit inherently, linked to the institution of 
great power management, which generally ‘serves to simplify the processes of international politics.’ 
It does so because of the inherent power differentials that characterize it.43 Yet, in his reading of 
international society, Hedley Bull argued that great power management served the scope of 
preserving a plurality of communities. Martin Wight, too, contemplated the possibility of hegemony 
in international society, but as a deviation of the preferable, anarchical plurality of states.44  
Adam Watson provided one of the first, if not the first, thorough discussion of hegemony in 
ES theory. He does so by conceptualizing the structure of relations between political communities as 
movements of a pendulum, or points on a spectrum.45 On one extreme end, there is full 
independence, while on the other extreme there is empire (no independence). Between these two 
ideal-types (for ‘they are theoretical absolutes, that do not occur in practice’46) there are hegemony, 
suzerainty and dominion. According to him, hegemony occurs when  
some power or authority in a system is able to “lay down the law” about the operation 
of the system, that is to determine to some extent the external relations between 
member states [of the system], while leaving them domestically independent.47  
A hegemonic system, in Watson’s thinking, differs from a suzerain system in that the latter involves 
political control over the unit(s) constituting the system. Suzerainty ‘is a vaguer concept’,48 which 
refers to a condition where one state exercises political control over another. Finally, a dominion is 
an arrangement in which ‘an imperial authority to some extent determines the internal government 
of other communities, but they nevertheless retain their identity as separate states and some 
control over their own affair’.49 These categories, as the images of the pendulum and spectrum 
convey, are not fixed, but evolve over history. 
For example, the institutionalization of spheres of influence in Eurasia over the course of the 
XIX century demonstrates how international society at that time was openly hierarchical. Given the 
occasional violation of sovereignty that they imply, spheres of influence did not amount to 
colonialism, although they could be the basis for it.50 Yet, they created and legitimized an 
international order that was the reflection of the hierarchical status of the different powers in the 
system, involving 1) prestige, 2) economic preponderance/expansion and 3) responsibility in diffusing 
civilization and government, with the latter often used instrumentally to justify the former two.51 
This was possible because the ‘constitution’ of international society at that time allowed for the 
implementation of legitimate spheres of influence, recognizable in the fact that such practice was 
mutually accepted among the great powers and dealt with the instruments of diplomacy, congresses 
and international law.52  
Conversely, within the contemporary international context, the norm of sovereign equality is 
deeply entrenched, to the extent that it can be characterised as a bedrock institution of 
contemporary international society.53 Therefore, the overt creation of a sphere of influence would 
mean going against the ‘constitutional pact’ of the society of states.54 While great powers still strive 
to impose their will and power onto other states, especially within their respective regional domains, 
justifications have to be sought in order to have a ‘green light’ from the international community 
and regional states as well. This is evident, for example, in discourses around humanitarian 
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intervention or the war on terror. In sum, differently from the past, the consent, the legitimacy of 
the ‘influenced’ must be obtained, so as not to incur in accusations of revisionism and outdated 
power-politics. In other words, nowadays there are two dimensions of legitimacy: not just external 
(coming from other great powers) but also internal (from within the sphere). This proves that a 
sphere of influence changes qua structure based on practices and norms, and has evolved from the 
XIX century when only the external dimension was necessary, being the sphere of influence imposed 
on weak/inferior polities at best or terra nullius at worst.55  
It is exactly because of these normative changes that I conceive of contemporary spheres of 
influence as social structures involving relations of ‘negotiated hegemony.’ The element of 
negotiation, meant as the process through which a state, through its sovereign prerogatives, 
accepts, accommodates and even resists different conditions posed by the hegemon,56 is crucial in 
the treatment of spheres of influence offered in this paper. As a matter of fact, in contemporary 
international society a sphere of influence as conceived of in the XIX century would be legally and 
morally unacceptable given the importance of the principle of sovereign equality among states. 
Therefore, in order to justify a sphere of influence, it is necessary to negotiate it and have some sort 
of legitimacy and recognition from those states within the sphere as well.  
The negotiation is conducted between all actors in the sphere by adhering (or, even more 
accurately, claiming to adhere) to those institutions of contemporary international society that are 
inherently opposed to spheres of influence, such as nationalism, sovereignty, international law and 
the balance of power exactly to accommodate a potential excess of influence, which would make 
the sphere illegitimate by resulting in direct political control and suzerainty. Watson himself 
implicitly acknowledges this, when saying that ‘hegemonies […] involve continual dialogue between 
the hegemonial authority and the other states, and a sense on both sides of the balance of 
expediency’.57  
Watson’s pendulum provides a useful methodological tool to distinguish between 
negotiated hegemony and more intrusive forms of influence, such as suzerainty or dominion. The 
key element is that of sovereignty. In a negotiated hegemony, sovereignty is in play as the smaller 
country is still politically independent and actively accepts the influence of the hegemon. Yet, when 
an assertion of sovereignty runs against the hegemonic influence, that is a sign that the hegemony is 
not negotiated anymore, but rather is resisted. Conversely, when the smaller country loses its 
political independence, then we are in the realm of suzerainty or dominion.  
As anticipated above, a sphere of influence conceptualized as a territorially-circumscribed 
negotiated hegemony can be seen as operating within the following three domains, based on the ES 
ontological tripartition introduced in the first section: provision of security (international system), 
broad normative influence (international society), cultural/civilizational cohesion (world society).58 
Furthermore, it involves three analytical components: actors, practices, and discourses. The actors 
are those people whose actions create, sustain, undermine, counter, endorse the sphere of 
influence. These are, usually, policy-makers, state representatives (be they presidents, ministers or 
ambassadors), lawmakers. Ordinary citizens and businessmen also play a role in creating or 
undermining the sphere of influence, by providing (or denying) legitimacy to it through discourses of 
acceptance (or resistance/hostility) and setting up/closing up economic relations that may turn to be 
unequal. Practices, defined as embodied, materially interwoven actions centrally organized around 
shared understandings,59 are meetings, conferences, summits, treaty signatures, endorsements of 
declarations, mutual support in international organizations, copy/pasting of domestic legislation, all 
of which sustain and give shape to the sphere of influence. Discourses are rhetorical indicators of the 
acceptance/rejection of the sphere of influence, and can be found at the official level as much as the 
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level of ordinary citizens as mentioned above. Narratives of ‘friendship’, ‘historical ties’, ‘protection’, 
‘ensuring security’ all play a role in legitimizing a sphere of influence, while discourse relying on 
‘patronage’, ‘dependency’, ‘intrusion’, ‘preponderance’, ‘bullying’ indicate a resistance to, or at least 
a contestation of, the sphere of influence. Examples of actors, practices and discourses are featured 
in the next section of the paper. 
The analytical components of a sphere of influence as a negotiated hegemony in the 
security, normative and cultural spheres identified above are summarized in Table 1: 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
 
As will be shown later in the paper, the element of negotiation brings into the picture the fact that 
smaller states (read: the elites) within the sphere of influence can push for material as well as 
ideational gains, thus skilfully bending the structure of a sphere of influence to their own advantage. 
In my opinion, this makes for a much more nuanced (and realistic) view of spheres of influence when 
we do not see the influenced states only as victims but as having agency and interests in their role as 
‘influenced’.60  
A negotiated hegemony is therefore different from mere ‘primacy’ exactly because an 
element of social recognition is necessary to guarantee the establishment and the functioning of a 
sphere of influence. In arguing this, I follow Ian Clark and his conceptualization of hegemony.61 To 
him, one should avoid conflating hegemony and primacy (or ‘predominance’), being the latter the 
mere superiority in material terms over a group of units.62 A main analytic theme is then that 
hegemony does not reside simply in indices of concentration of material power, taken in isolation 
from societal responses to it. Instead, to find proper hegemonic behaviour, one should look for 
episodes ‘where a concentration of power, at the very least, has not elicited counterbalancing 
coalitions, or active policies of resistance from other states,’63 such as those identified in Table 1.  
This helps clarify the following theoretical conundrum. The reader may recall that a society 
of states can be global or regional. Yet, if a regional international society is a society of equals (i.e. 
sovereign states), is a sphere of influence conceptualized as a negotiated hegemony a negation of it? 
To be sure, a sphere of influence is not a negation of a regional international society. Rather, it is a 
specific configuration of it, where the regional great power exercises a degree of exclusive indirect 
control on the military, normative and cultural aspects of the region with the acquiescence of other 
regional states, which retain their sovereign prerogatives but align them to the preferences of the 
regional great power.64 It is a regional international society in which the institution of great power 
management occasionally binds, without breaking/violating, the institution of sovereignty (as it 
would be the case with suzerainty or dominion) with the consent of regional states themselves. 
When the hegemon breaks the limits imposed on the influence it can deliver, such as imposing a 
Presidential candidate or by sending troops without the request of a regional state, the sphere of 
influence moves from a negotiated hegemony to suzerainty or dominion, and thus becomes 
illegitimate.  
Having introduced the notion of negotiated hegemony and elaborated on it, identifying its 
analytical components and its conceptual boundaries, the next section discusses such 
conceptualization of spheres of influence with reference to contemporary relations between Russia 
and the Central Asian states, i.e. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. 
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The argument is based on news articles (in English and Russian, from international, Russian and local 
sources), diplomatic documents and secondary literature, corroborated by excerpts from elite 
interviews conducted in English by the author with diplomats and experts in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan in the period October 2013-May 2014. The interviews, conducted at the time of the 
Ukrainian crisis, were about the broad of topic of international relations and norms in Central Asia, 
and the excerpts used in this paper refer specifically to the role of Russia as a great power in the 
region. Furthermore, such interviews were conducted with the belief that the words of those who 
‘do’ international relations in the region, if appropriately triangulated with additional material, can 
shed light on dynamics of power and legitimacy underpinning the establishment of a sphere of 
influence. In this respect, I should stress that political events unfolding in the region when 
conducting the interviews did not seem to have an impact on the respondents’ openness, as they 
were rarely mentioned. 
 
A Russian sphere of influence in Central Asia? 
The former section defined contemporary legitimate spheres of influence as negotiated hegemony 
within a regional international society, where a hegemon exercises a degree of influence that is 
legitimated by other regional states. Following the tripartition introduced above, such negotiated 
hegemony can be seen in three different domains: security, norms and rules, and culture. The 
remainder of this section will look at the three domains and at the acceptance of/resistance to 
hegemonic practices in each of them. 
 
Provision of security 
In security terms, Russia is the legitimate security guarantor in the region. This has to do with 
security as much as with identity/status reasons. As argued by Tsygankov, Russia’s goal is to secure 
its status as a regional great power so to aspire to be a global power.65 For example, at the bilateral 
level, Kazakhstan imports of arms from Russia have risen, up from $50 to $412 million between 2010 
and 2015; in 2010, Russian arms transfers to Kyrgyzstan ($109k) made up 27.9% of overall arms 
transfers, and in 2015 (at $505k) they made up 50.3% of total arms transfers to Kyrgyzstan indicating 
a growth in both absolute and proportional terms, while Tajikistan spent $496.7k to buy weapons 
from Russia in 2013, to then spend $8m in 2015.66 While these figures clearly represent different 
economic conditions and possibilities for military investments, they also show an upward trend in 
importing Russian weapons in the region. In addition, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan still host permanent 
Russian military bases on their territory,67 and there is the chance to establish more, specifically an 
airbase in Tajikistan and another one in Kyrgyzstan.68 Furthermore, all states in the region enjoy a 
strategic partnership with it, and consider its role in the security realm as ‘a priority’ or ‘a factor of 
peace and stability’.69 In relation to the notion of spheres of influence, it is important to underline 
that a ‘strategic partnership’ often involves privileged access/provision of security, economic and 
military assistance, exchange of secret information and documents, frequency of meetings at the 
high political level, privileges not shared with other states.70  
From a multilateral perspective, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is the 
main vehicle for Russia’s influence. The CSTO depends on Russia for its hardware, and the Kremlin 
has agreed to sell military equipment to its CSTO partners at the same subsidized rate paid by the 
Russian military.71 Moreover, Art. 17 of the CSTO Charter suggests that Russia has an 
institutionalized hegemony within the organization. The article foresees that the Secretariat (i.e. the 
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‘permanent working organ of the Organization’) ‘shall be composed of nationals of the member 
states (officials) according to a quota based on the proportion of a member State’s contribution to 
the Organization’s budget’. Given that Russia contributes with more or less 50% of the total budget, 
it is easy to see a hegemonic position here.  
In addition, and in line with the theoretical framework outlined above, there is an element 
of external legitimacy in play, too: recognized as an official multilateral regional arrangement ex Art. 
53 and 54 of the UN Charter on regional arrangements, the United Nations General Assembly 
conferred observer status on the CSTO in 2004,72 while UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and his 
CSTO counterpart Nikolay Bordyuzha issued a joint statement in March 2010 affirming their shared 
commitment to the supremacy of the UN as a source of international legitimacy and committing the 
UN to help the CSTO improve its peace and security promotion capabilities in the region while de 
facto recognizing Russia’s preeminent role in the region.73 
Art. 7 of the CSTO Charter is also important because it includes a provision of ‘exclusivity’ of 
the alleged sphere: ‘The member States shall adopt a decision on the stationing of groupings of 
forces in their territories and of military facilities of States which are not members of the 
Organisation after holding urgent consultations (coordinating) with the other member states’, thus 
de facto leaving Russia with a veto power on the issue, given that this clearly applies to member 
states other than Russia and given Russia’s voting quota mentioned above. This is important because 
it shows, again, how in contemporary international society a sphere of influence can be negotiated 
through the establishment of regional security organizations based on international law. As noted by 
Orakhelashvili,  
regional organizations can serve the purpose both of projecting the regional influence 
of a great power of that region, as well as excluding the influence and presence of other 
extra-regional great powers. Regional unity in geopolitical attitudes makes more 
efficient to maintain spheres of influence or interests, or keep external influence out. 
This corresponds to the consensual nature of international law, as opposed to unilateral 
approach in determining spheres of influence.74  
All in all, the CSTO Charter represents the clearest document that represents the notion of 
‘negotiated hegemony’ dealt with above, with Russia acknowledging the role of other partners in 
carrying out CSTO’s duties and activities but de facto retaining the lead, stressing in each document 
or communiqué elements of ‘stability’ and ‘responsibility’.75 This is fully in line with what has been 
said earlier in the paper, i.e. that nowadays under regional arrangements ‘great powers abandon 
claims to intervene unilaterally in their sphere of influence, in return for the chance to play an 
important role in a regional arrangement’.76  
Yet, exactly because of the ‘negotiated’ character of Russia’s influence, there are also 
elements that somehow run against an outspoken Russian military dominance in the region, 
showing that ‘the consensual nature’ of international law is in this case based on weak 
foundations.77 One example can be the proposal that the Kazakh government made in 2011 to have 
a Shanghai Cooperation Organization military force as well, promptly blocked by Russia.78 In fact, it is 
not by chance that recent talks over a NATO-like force for Central Asia, strictly under Russian 
command, have been revamped again, with Russian President Vladimir Putin proposing a joint task-
force of Russia and Central Asian states to defend the region’s borders from the Taliban based in 
Afghanistan.79 
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A second example can be Uzbekistan pulling out of the CSTO in 2012, allegedly due to the overly 
Russian character of the organization.80 The fact that Russia could do nothing to prevent Uzbekistan 
from leaving and the fact that Uzbekistan passed a new foreign policy concept in the same year 
prohibiting the establishment of military bases on its territory show the fact that Russia has to 
conform to the current constitutional dictates of international society, viz. coercion shall not be.81 It 
is important to note that also the new Uzbek President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has announced that 
Uzbekistan will continue to stay outside the CSTO legal and military framework.82 
Furthermore, after the events in 2010 in the city of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan, where Kyrgyz and 
Uzbeks were involved in inter-ethnic clashes that caused almost 500 dead, Uzbekistan managed to 
prevent the opening of a new Russian military base in southern Kyrgyzstan, exactly to curb excessive 
Russian influence in the region and preserving the regional balance of power.83 While scholars refer 
to the unwillingness of Russia to intervene in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 as a sign of ‘failed hegemony’,84 it is 
forgotten that ‘Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not want that to happen so to not create a precedent. 
Also, the majority of the people and of politicians was against.’85 This, again, shows that a legitimate 
sphere of influence should not lead to military intervention and a violation of sovereignty, unless 
specifically foreseen by international legal documents and agreements. Otherwise, the legitimate 
sphere of influence would turn into a suzerain system, and therefore illegitimate according to 
contemporary international standards, as Russia has learnt from the sanctions imposed on it after 
the events in Crimea.86  
In addition, when it comes to disputes between two or more Central Asian states, Russia’s 
hegemony is kept at bay. For example, when Tajikistan turned to Russia in order to resolve border 
problems with Kyrgyzstan in 2012, this caused protests both in Bishkek and Tashkent. Indeed,  
this was seen as a bad act in the region, both by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. If you turn 
to a third party, you don’t recognise equality, you break the deal, you acknowledge a 
big brother. You infringe equality; you create a hierarchy. No one liked the move, you 
don’t do this in Central Asia.87   
This shows, again, how Central Asian states ‘embroil’ Russia’s military and security influence and 
preponderance by relying on the institutions of sovereignty, non-interference and balance of power 
when it comes to regional affairs. 
Lastly, in 2013 Tajik President Rahmon did not renew automatically the contract for the 
Russian 201st Military Base in Tajikistan, but rather negotiated it for months at the highest level in 
exchange for better provisions for Tajik migrants in Russia and support in the presidential 
elections.88 This examples demonstrates, again, how despite clear imbalances of military and 
economic power, the Central Asian states are actively participating in defining the contours and the 
intensity of the sphere of influence, taming Russia’s hegemony by relying on their rights as sovereign 
states and dictating some conditions as equals, too. 
 
Normative influence 
With respect to normative influence, meant as the ability to shape norms and rules of conduct, 
Russia has been considered the fiercest promoter of ‘Westphalian values’ in Central Asia, as well as 
of authoritarian practices.89 This can be said both from an international and a domestic viewpoint.  
From an international viewpoint, previous research has shown the high similarity and 
convergence in voting between the Central Asian republics and Russia at the UN General Assembly.90 
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In particular, strong emphasis on sovereignty, non-interference, respect for borders and acceptance 
of the authority of the UN are the normative keystone of this group of states, with Central Asian 
states happy to bandwagon normatively with Russia to shield themselves from pressures over 
human rights protection and democratization. In addition, this normative convergence is enhanced 
by Arts. 8, 9 and 10 of the CSTO Charter, stressing the need to find common positions on matters of 
international politics and security.  
From a domestic viewpoint, and especially over the last five years, Russia has often 
legitimized restrictions on human rights, NGOs operations as well as practices cracking down 
opponents for the purpose of ‘order and stability’.91 As has been noted, ‘Russia is more repressive 
than it has ever been in the post-Soviet era,’ and this has had an impact also on the ‘near abroad.’92 
Russian political scientists and lawyers are said to have had an impact on several legislative practices 
in the Central Asian countries, and the latter are often quite willing to look at Moscow for new laws 
to pass.93 As Mirsuljan Namazaaly, a political economist in Bishkek, said, ‘many laws [in Kyrgyzstan] 
are just copying the laws from Russia; presidents and members of parliament always look at Russia 
and do what Russia can approve.’94 
In addition, state visits often work as domestic ‘legitimacy-boosters’ for the presidents. As a 
matter of fact, a subtler aspect of the normative dimension of a sphere of influence is the legitimacy 
bestowed on leadership in smaller countries from the hegemon. A quick survey of trips of Central 
Asian leaders to Russia reveals not just that Russia is by far the place most visited by Central Asian 
presidents overall,95 but also it is the usual destination as the last trip before presidential elections or 
the first after them.96 This can signal that ultimately Russia is the depository of the legitimacy of the 
system at play in Central Asia in terms not just of government but also of governance. It is in 
Moscow that the Central Asian raison de système finds its legitimation. This is mostly evident in the 
words of a Kyrgyz official:  
Russia ensures that it plays a decisive role. They cannot give an official recognition, they 
can attempt to obstruct, they can attempt to provide some guarantees, for example, if a 
situation arises in the sphere of security. [Nevertheless], the most important source of 
recognition, support and legitimacy [for the Kyrgyz government] is Moscow.97  
As a matter of fact, the special place of the region in the foreign policy priorities of the Russian 
Federation is still supported by the high intensity of political interaction: during the year of 2015 
there were 25 meetings held at the higher and 19 held at the high levels. 
However, again, there are signs of the necessity of negotiate some of these norms and their 
interpretation, in particular sovereignty. Russia’s recent actions in Crimea have made Central Asian 
states warier about its intention in the region, especially given Moscow’s interpretation of 
sovereignty as a political capacity and not as a legal right.98 In particular, Uzbekistan voiced its 
concerns especially with respect to ‘threats to sovereignty’ and respect of international law in an 
official communiqué immediately after the events in Crimea.99 Putin’s recent comments on 
Kazakhstan’s limited experience of statehood generated a harsh rebuttal from Kazakh President 
Nazarbayev, who said Kazakhstan will not be part of organizations that pose threats to its 
independence.100 In fact, Kazakh Foreign Minister Idrisov was quick in drafting a bilateral Russia-
Kazakhstan border delimitation document to submit it to the United Nations, arguing that this was a 
necessary step to enhance Kazakhstan’s security.101 
Normative resistance has also been encountered at the domestic level, when the Kyrgyz 
Parliament rejected earlier this year a controversial bill aimed at controlling the activities of NGOs 
12 
 
operating on Kyrgyz soil registering them as ‘foreign agents’ allegedly to please international 
partners other than Russia and therefore responding to balance-of-power logics. This bill was 
modelled on a Russian bill that had been passed in 2012, and Moscow is said to have put pressure 
on several lawmakers and politicians to achieve the same outcome in Kyrgyzstan, promising 
investments in much-needed hydro-power projects. When it as clear that the investments would not 
be made, the Kyrgyz Parliament rejected the bill.102 Once again, this shows how Central Asian states 
can indeed resist Russia’s hegemony when it becomes too intrusive and when it does not come with 
benefits, be they material or reputational. 
Furthermore, different considerations of equality, balance of power and sovereignty show 
how even the establishment of military facilities in the Central Asian republics are subject to 
presidential scrutiny, have to be agreed with them and sometimes can be used as bargaining chip (as 
the case of Tajikistan discussed above suggests), or vocally opposed as the late Uzbek President 
Karimov did with the prospects of a new base in southern Kyrgyzstan as noted above. Again, this 
relates to the fact that now the Central Asian republics are more aware of their condition as 
independent states, the multiplicity of opportunities that the international environment offers in 
terms of diversification of foreign policy and their active role in any negotiations involving 
hegemonic activities in the region.103  
 
Civilizational cohesion 
The two forms of influence discussed above are underpinned by a strong civilizational and cultural 
affinity between Russia and the Central Asian states qua former Soviet republics. It should be 
remembered that cultural or civilizational difference from culturally- or civilizationally-defined world 
regions is one of the prerequisites for the existence of the geopolitical view of international 
relations, and Russia is by no means exception in this.104 As noted by Gadzhiev, ‘geopolitics does not 
research only international relations between sovereign states. It allows us to understand the whole 
complex of relations between nations, regions, cultures, historical-cultural circles, national 
economies etc.’105 Civilizational and cultural terms do give rise ‘to a pursuit of milieu goals, a 
corollary of great power status and spheres of influence.’106 
An example of how the different strands of influence are tied is seen in how, for example, in 
multilateral and bilateral military treaties between Russia and the Central Asian republics, as well as 
in the course of bilateral meetings, there are constant references to elements of common past, 
heritage, civilization and brotherhood. In addition, according to M-Vector, a Central Asian polling 
and consulting firm, Russian media make up approximately 90% of the media consumed by Central 
Asians every day.107 This illustrates a powerful ability on the part of the Kremlin to shape within the 
region’s public perceptions of Putin and of the various Central Asian leaders (which provides the 
Kremlin with a powerful point of leverage over the governments of the region), as well as to 
denigrate Russia’s major competitors in the region, particularly China and the United States.  
A couple of figures illustrate the point. In 2012, the approval rating of Putin within 
Kyrgyzstan stood at 90% - a figure even higher than Putin's approval rating within Russia, which was 
85% in July according to the Moscow-based Levada Center. Putin's approval rating in Tajikistan 
similarly stood at 85%. People in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also both overwhelmingly perceive Russia 
to be a more powerful world actor than the United States. In 2012, in Kazakhstan, the vast majority 
of the population agreed that Russia should be the top-priority foreign country (64.5%), while almost 
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73.9% of the population had a positive perception of Russia in the security, economic and cultural 
spheres.108 
As in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Russian television (although not print media) also dominate 
in Turkmenistan, a media market that is likely the least trusted in the region in terms of having 
respected, solid content. Yet, also in this case, there are signs of a negotiated hegemony and 
resistance. While Turkmenistan has been friendly to Russia on the surface, Turkmen President 
Gurbanguly Berdimukhamedov is wary to share the loyalty of his people with Vladimir Putin. The 
Turkmen government, while not openly contesting Russian presence in the media, is attempting to 
force consumers to switch from satellite television, which gives the public a wide range of 
information sources, to cable television, which his regime can more easily control.109  
Overall, though, not everything that Moscow does or is willing to do in Central Asia is 
without hurdles. Once more, the cultural/civilizational influence of Russia is ‘negotiated’ with the 
Central Asian republics. For years, there have been tense negotiations between Russia and 
Turkmenistan with respect to the issue of double-nationality,110 while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan 
have started a process of Latinization of their alphabet,111 and Tajikistan has started removing 
Russian names from villages to replace them with Tajik ones.112 One very recent case, again 
pertaining to Tajikistan, is the suspension of the Russian newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda after 
derogatory remarks on the country were made in it, showing once again that the reputation of 
Central Asian presidents is not negotiable in the establishment of a sphere of influence in the 
region.113  
Furthermore, while Russian remains the common language between elites, all Central Asian 
states are developing policies aimed at fostering national languages as means to cement 
nationalism. As published recently in a policy report in Kazakhstan, Russian is still the lingua franca 
within the region because of historical, diplomatic and bureaucratic reasons. Yet,  
with the departure of the old guard, in the person of Rahmon, Nazarbayev and Karimov, 
the Russian authorities will find it very hard to maintain 'friendship' with the Central 
Asian countries on the old terms: the fairy tales about [common] traditions and striking 
the cord of us having similar mentalities will have to be backed up with specific political 
and economic moves.114  
This is not to say that Russian, as a lingua franca, will disappear, as if speaking one or more 
languages was a zero-sum game.115 Yet, with the advent of the new generation of Central Asians, 
national languages, English,116 and Chinese,117 are also likely to develop as means of communication, 
thus undermining Russian predominance. 
Such careful considerations and moves also in the cultural sphere can be explained both 
with nation-building processes in the Central Asian republics (and therefore with emphasis on the 
practices of nationalism, sovereignty and balance of power) as well as with Russia’s attitude toward 
Central Asia as ambivalent, sometimes considering them as sovereign states, sometimes as ‘not 
quite foreign’. It will be remembered that already in the early 1990s, Boris Yeltsin argued Russia's 
ties with the Central Asian republics were ‘closer than traditional neighbourhood relations; rather, 
this is a blood relationship.’118 More recently, Putin stated that most people in Kazakhstan wanted 
closer relations with Russia and to remain part of the ‘big Russian world,’119 having added previously 
that ‘the situation in [Central Asia] directly impacts the national security in Russia, the well-being of 
over 5 million [Russian] compatriots [sootechestvenniki] living [there].’120 Despite being based on 
elements of affinity and commonality, remarks of this sort put Central Asian states on the defensive, 
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stimulating an adversarial balance of power and thus de-legitimizing Russia’s hegemony in the 
region and favouring a multi-vectoral foreign policy towards China and the US, i.e. a foreign policy 
that seeks to develop good relations with more than a great power with the aim of balancing them. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has made the case that spheres of influence as conceived in the past are not returning. In 
fact, to maintain their legitimacy as social structures they have evolved and have had to come to 
terms with institutions of international society that, in principle, are tension with them, such as 
sovereignty, international law and nationalism. When such institutions are violated or dismissed, as 
in the Crimean case, legitimacy is lost and political costs to maintain the sphere rise exponentially.121 
 
The case of Central Asia well demonstrates how hegemonic influence and the sphere coming 
out from it are ‘constrained and limited by the rules and institutions of any organised system, and 
more strongly by an international society whose rules are reinforced by shared codes of conduct and 
beliefs. Hegemonic pressures inside a system inevitably provoke some degree of anti-hegemonial 
resistance’.122 And this despite the fact that Russia cannot feel secure surrounded by unfriendly 
countries and will try to have a definitive voice in structuring the region’s security architecture.123 
Such anti-hegemonial moves have been summarized in Table 1. As far as the security dimension is 
concerned, they include diversification of weapon supplies, military drills with other powers, 
joining/forming other blocs or leaving the hegemonic bloc, and strategic partnership agreements 
with extra-regional states. With respect to norms and rules, anti-hegemonial moves can be 
considered the endorsement/adoption of norms and rules that run against the hegemon’s 
interests/actions, and/or outspoken condemnation of the hegemon’s actions in the region from a 
normative viewpoint. Furthermore, anti-hegemonial moves from a cultural perspective include 
diversification of language policies, priority to local media and news outlet, limitations imposed on 
the hegemon’s media, and emphasis on nationalism and nation-building. 
 
Having in mind the ES triad of international system, international society, and world society 
outlined in the first section of the paper, Russia’s influence in Central Asia is visible in all three 
domains (system, related to security; society, related to norms; world society, related to culture), 
and as a regional great power it has received recognition and legitimacy. As the late Uzbek President 
Karimov noted, ‘Russia has been in this region, and, I believe, will remain there. There can be no two 
ways about it.’124 This presence, as was discussed above, has been recognized also at the 
international level at the UN, thus conforming to international law. Yet, this by no means amounts to 
a primacy imposed unilaterally as it was in the past. Through the institutions of balance of power, 
nationalism, international law and sovereignty, the Central Asian states accommodate Russia’s 
influence while at the same time diversifying their foreign policies and seeking other international 
partners, developing their own understandings and practices of international norms and combining 
Soviet cultural legacies with local and national histories and narratives. In other words, the regional 
consensus over Russia’s influence is existent but not fixed, constantly negotiated, based on 
‘restrained dissonances’ and pragmatic ‘acquiescence’ based on the elites’ interests.125 
 
The numerous examples of hegemonic practices as well as counter-hegemonic practices in 
the three fields identified as parts of a sphere of influence in Central Asia (security, norms, culture) 
have shown that nowadays spheres of influence do not involve mere material primacy over a given, 
exclusionary territory anymore, as was more the case in the past. Rather, they now involve 
negotiations and tensions, meanings and understandings, all of which have to be researched if 
theorists are to make full sense of contemporary attempts to create and maintain spheres of 
influence.  Scholars need to avoid assuming the meaning of spheres of influence as fixed and 
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immutable. As they are the product of social practices, their meaning and their operation have to be 
constantly negotiated and redefined according to the prevailing logics of legitimacy of international 
society at a given time. 
 
The ES analysis of spheres of influence offered in this paper, emphasizing discourses, 
negotiations, and practices of statecraft, echoes critical approaches to geopolitics and their focus on 
geopolitical representations of territory and spatiality. For example, the way Russian officials adopt 
notions of ‘security’ and ‘responsibility’ in Central Asia in order to form a security community under 
Russia’s aegis, and the way in which the Central Asian governments negotiate the limits of such 
community, well parallel critical analyses of geopolitical discourses of strategic regionalisation and 
regional identity.126 At the same time, the civilizational elements of the sphere of influence 
highlighted in the paper, emphasizing a common language, a common past, but also the role of 
rising nationalism and cultural diversity, aptly lend themselves to critical studies of the geopolitics of 
cultural communities.127 More synergies between the ES and critical geopolitics are welcome not just 
with respect to spheres of influence, but to regions more widely. A fruitful avenue of research, for 
instance, may be that of looking at how specific regional international societies, as well as the 
boundaries and the members thereof, are meaningfully constructed, rather than treated as 
essentialized, by specific political agendas and ideas, based on specific territorial and geographical 
understandings and narratives. 
 
In conclusion, this paper has aimed to humbly provide an additional conceptualization of the 
constitution and implementation of spheres of influence, which intends to be complementary to 
those already present in the literature. To be sure, there is still much to be done at the theoretical 
and empirical level. For example, the notion of sphere of influence calls into question the status of 
sovereignty as a primary institution of international society. Can the ES still claim that sovereignty is 
a primary institution, if in fact it is sometimes relative to an outside power’s demands?128 Yet, the 
hope is that the conceptualization offered in this paper, based on the notion of negotiated 
hegemony and on the consideration of the institutional structure of contemporary international 
society, will foster further comparative work to see whether in other regions other examples of 
spheres of influence as structures of negotiated hegemony are to be found, and how different 
institutions of international society, such as sovereignty, international law and nationalism are 
reinterpreted within regions to accommodate and resist hegemonic practices.  
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